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SEPARATING THE WHEAT FROM THE TARES: THE SUPREME
COURT’S PREMATURE STRICT SCRUTINY OF RACE-BASED
REMEDIAL MEASURES IN PUBLIC EDUCATION

I. INTRODUCTION
As I frequented the ironically named Martin Luther
King, Jr. Boulevard through the eastern portion of Lubbock,
Texas, during my time living in the area from 2010-2012, I
found this major thoroughfare to be a physical separator of
Lubbock’s Black residents from the rest of the city. 1 This street
became a tangible marker of the continued housing patterns
caused by decades of legalized segregation among Lubbock’s
residents. I also found the city’s Latino residents to be heavily
segregated from many of the Black and White residents (who
were concentrated in the nicer southwestern part of Lubbock),
and remarked that there could be such a sharp tri-racial division
in any American town decades after the Civil Rights movement
in the 1960s and 1970s. 2
In this article, I provide some historical context to Lubbock’s de facto segregation patterns and use Lubbock’s history
as a microcosm to illustrate the failure of the desegregation
movement in the United States during the 1970s and 1980s to
create a long-term desegregation in public schools. I then seek
to demonstrate that it is socially damaging when American jurists ascribe to the myth of post-racialism.

1. See LLOYD POTTER, OFFICE OF THE STATE DEMOGRAPHER, TEXAS AND
LUBBOCK: DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS AND TRENDS (2011), http://txsdc.utsa.edu/
Resources/Presentations/OSD/2011/2011_12_13_Lubbock_Chamber_of_Commerce.pdf.
2. Race and Ethnicity in Lubbock, Texas, STATISTICAL ATLAS (Sept. 12, 2018),
https://statisticalatlas.com/place/Texas/Lubbock/Race-and-Ethnicity; Potter, supra note 1.
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This article is not intended as a comprehensive evaluation of the history of racism in the United States, affirmative
action, or other remedial measures. Rather, I briefly discuss the
complex relationship between race and the law in public education, and why American jurisprudence should continue to allow
race-based remedial measures.
In this paper, I attempt to do the following: (I) briefly
describe the history of de jure segregation in Lubbock schools,
as an illustrative example of the complexities of race in the U.S.
education system; (II) describe why the concept of “postracialism” society is a harmful myth that distracts American jurists from allowing race-based remedial measures to counter
continued damage both from past de jure segregation and continued de facto segregation; (III) describe the need for continued use of race-based remedial measures to establish “true” integration and diversity in the American public education
system. 3
II. LUBBOCK TEXAS: A CASE STUDY FOR THE NATION
There is significant damage done to a city’s school system when cities take on a post-racial mindset while racism remains an significant issue in the community. This occurs when
cities in the U.S. seek to focus on the future “after” racism,
without actually eliminating, both “root and branch,” the legal,
political, and social effects of centuries of racist laws. 4 Jurists
have a duty as guardians of the Constitution, with a duty to

3. See “true” integration and diversity defined infra, Section III.
4. Green v. County School Board, 391 U.S. 430, 438 (1968) (“We bear in mind that
the court has not merely the power but the duty to render a decree which will so far as possible
eliminate the discriminatory effects of the past as well as bar like discrimination in the future.”);
see also MARGUERITE L. SPENCER, ET AL, THE BENEFITS OF RACIAL AND ECONOMIC
INTEGRATION IN OUR EDUCATION SYSTEM: WHY THIS MATTERS FOR OUR DEMOCRACY,
6-11 (Kirwan Inst. for the Study of Race and Ethnicity: Ohio State Univ. 2009) (discussing the
damage caused by de facto racial and socioeconomic segregation).
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protect society from both overtly racist laws as well as law
which undermine racial and ethnic minority groups through
indirect disparate impact.
The situation of Lubbock, Texas provides an illustrative
case study for the damage done when cities make such a premature jump to post-racialist mindset before actually eliminating
the effects of racism.

A. Residential Segregation and Education in Lubbock
In 2006, the Lubbock City Council discovered that City
Ordinance 225, which imposed race-based housing segregation,
was still technically part of the city’s code. 5 Ordinance 225 was
passed by the city council in 1923, and imposed a fine up to
$200 (the equivalent of $2,917.44 in 2018) for any Black resident of Lubbock who tried to live anywhere outside of the
southeastern quadrant of Lubbock. 6 The 1923 city council’s
reasoning for Ordinance 225 was laid out in no uncertain
terms. The ordinance stated that the “residence [of Blacks] is
dangerous to the health and pollutes the earth and atmosphere.” 7 The city council’s blatantly racist reasoning is a mere
snapshot of the social, political, and legal rhetoric that was written into city and state law throughout the United States during
the Jim Crow era, which included the segregation of such places as parks, cemeteries, theaters, and restaurants. 8 While Ordi-

5. City Council Repeals Segregation Ordinance, KCBD NEWS CHANNEL 11
LUBBOCK, April 26, 2006, http://www.kcbd.com/story/4823976/city-council-repealssegregation-ordinance; Council to Get Rid of 83-Year-Old Ordinance Defining Segregation,
KCBD NEWS CHANNEL 11 LUBBOCK, April 25, 2006, http://www.kcbd.com/story/4818279/
council-to-get-rid-of-83-year-old-ordinance-defining-segregation/.
6. Calculate the value of $200 in 1923, DOLLAR TIMES, https://www.dollartimes.com/
inflation/inflation.php?amount=200&year=1923 (last visited April 19, 2018); Council to Get
Rid of 83-Year-Old Ordinance, supra note 5.
7. Council to Get Rid of 83-Year-Old Ordinance, supra note 5.
8. Melvin I. Urofsky, Jim Crow Law, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (August 20, 2018),
/https://www.britannica.com/event/Jim-Crow-law.
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nance 225 had not been enforced for decades, the presence of
the ordinance in the archives of the city’s code as recently as
2006 indicates that Lubbock had not carefully sought to rid itself of even overt, albeit unenforced, racism in its communities. 9 As one legal scholar stated: “Post-racialism does not challenge this indifference, this sense that we are not responsible
for or capable of remedying racial injustice. It rather reassures
us there is no injustice there to be remedied. Surely such expiation can only delay racial justice.” 10 Thus, despite the recognition of continued racial inequities and racial segregation by
scholars and informed leaders in the country, leaders in Lubbock and too many leaders throughout the nation seem to continue to ignore and perhaps in some instances even perpetuate
the myth of post-racialism. 11
Perhaps even more concerning than the presence of an
unenforced racist law in Lubbock is the euphemistic rhetoric
surrounding the discovery of Ordinance 225. The author of the
article reporting the discovery of Ordinance 225 states that
“[y]ou can find signs of unity and integration across Lubbock
today. However, a part of Lubbock’s past many would like to
forget is resurfacing. . . . [t]he nation has made great strides in
the civil rights movement since 1923.” 12 This language spurs
the question: why are leaders in Lubbock, and throughout the
nation, seeking to forget the racist past? Should not this awful,
but true, part of the nation’s history be remembered to avoid

9. See e.g., Patrick McGrain, The Myth of Post-racial America, WHYY (February 24,
2018), https://whyy.org/articles/myth-post-racial-america/; Michael C. Dawson & Lawrence
D. Bobo, One Year Later and the Myth of a Post-Racial Society, 6 DU BOIS REVIEW: SOCIAL
SCIENCE RESEARCH ON RACE, no. 2, 247–249 (2009), https://dash.harvard.edu/handle/1/
10347165; Ian F. Haney López, Is the “Post” in Post-Racial the “Blind” in Colorblind?, 32
CARDOZO L. REV. 807, 830-31 (2011).
10. López, supra note 9, at 831.
11. See e.g., McGrain, supra note 9; Dawson & Bobo, supra note 9; López, supra note
9, at 830-31.
11. López, supra note 9, at 831.
12. Council to Get Rid of 83-Year-Old Ordinance, supra note 5 (emphasis added).
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ever allowing legally sanctioned prejudice to exist in the United
States again? Should not, then, the nation’s racist history serve
as a motivator to remove de facto racism and bigotry? The illusion of moving beyond racism is not only unhelpful but is actually harmful in the sense that it leads the American public to
falsely believe that there is not more work that needs to be done
in establishing racial equality. 13
The article titled “Council To Get Rid of 83-Year-Old
Ordinance Defining Segregation” provides the common rhetoric of post-racialists—that Lubbock has progressed since the
civil rights movement—by citing the fact that the city has a major road named after civil rights leader Martin Luther King Jr.
What the author fails to mention is that Lubbock’s MLK
Boulevard ironically follows the very border that was used to
segregate Lubbock’s Black residents for so many years. 14 The
article betrays the author’s ignorance, which they share with
many other post-racialists, that may lead a reader to conclude
that the mere fact of a city memorializing a civil rights leader
on a street sign or a school equates to the city (and impliedly
the entire nation where streets and landmarks throughout it at
named after civil rights leaders) making “great strides” in combating racism and repairing the damage done by legally institutionalized racism. 15
This ignorance extends to government leaders, as was
apparent in a local Lubbock news article, where the author provided a quotation from two members of the 2006 Lubbock City
Council. One councilmember stated that “[t]here are a lot of
things in our past that none of us are proud of and we hope
those get rectified and things get better as we move along as a

13. See e.g., McGrain, supra note 9; Dawson & Bobo, supra note 9; López, supra note
9, at 830-31.
14. Council to Get Rid of 83-Year-Old Ordinance, supra note 5.
15. Id.
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country, as a state, and also as a city.” 16 Another councilmember
stated that “[w]e don’t need anything like [Ordinance 225] on
the books of Lubbock where people can go back and research
and say this that and the other. We need to move forward, not
stay back where we were in 1923.” 17 While it is true that government leaders cannot merely refer to the past to improve the
laws of the future, leaders should not ignore U.S. history in
making legal and policy determinations. The nation’s history
contains vital context that government leaders must heed if they
are to avoid the mistakes of past generations and make the right
decisions moving forward.
While it is troubling, in and of itself, that it took close to
a century for the Lubbock City Council to specifically remove
Ordinance 225 from its record books, it is symbolic of an even
larger issue: many political leaders and the electorate of the
United States appear to ascribe to the claim that the U.S. is
now in a “post-racial” period, without addressing the continued
consequences of past centuries of de jure segregation and current de facto racism. One sociology and critical race theory
scholar has explained the dichotomy between post-racial rhetoric used in public discourse (especially in the wake of President
Obama’s election and reelection as the first “Black” president)
and the continued consequences of racism:
Society appears to be experiencing confusion about the continued existence of racism.
This confusion stems from the existence of clear
inequalities in social outcomes, on one hand, and
the election of an African American to the White
House, on the other. Obama’s own rhetoric has
blinded Americans to the realities of continuing
16. Id.
17. Id.
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racial inequities. Using a CRT narrative, we can
juxtapose Obama’s rhetoric with reality and conclude that we are not, in fact, in a post-racial period.
As our research demonstrates, Americans
are confronted with two sides of a dichotomy: the
promise of a post-racial narrative as well as the
permanence of racism. Our participants revealed
the emotional power contained in the post-racial
narrative: Americans want to believe we are in a
post-racial period, even to the exclusion of evidence of the contrary. On a larger scale, believing
that we have entered a post-racial period may result in a lack of attention to the very real products of continued, systemic racism in society.
These products include inequities in educational
outcomes, incarceration rates, employment patterns, health care, housing availability and quality, and racial profiling. 18

Consequently, political leaders in the United States and
many of their constituents, continue to keep themselves ignorant of the ongoing consequences of past de jure racism and
current de facto racism. The history and current situation of de
jure and de facto segregation in Lubbock serves as a case study
to provide essential insight into the ongoing damage inflicted
on society by racism and segregation.
The harmful consequences of Lubbock’s history of legalized residential segregation is perhaps most apparent in the
effect it has had on the city’s public-school system. Between
1950 and 1977, as the population of Lubbock (especially within

18. Bettina L. Love & Brandelyn Tosolt, Reality or Rhetoric? Barack Obama and PostRacial America, 17 JEAN AIT BELKHIR, RACE, GENDER & CLASS J., no. 3/4, 19, 33 (2010).
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the White community) significantly increased, the population
also became increasingly more divided along racial lines. 19
White flight resulted in a large movement of Whites from the
northeast and north-central portion of Lubbock to the southwestern part of town. 20 Many Black and Latino residents then
filled the homes vacated by White tenants—creating extreme
de facto residential segregation. 21 Lubbock maintained a complicated set of rules for transferring students, in order to discourage integration. 22 One of the primary deterrents that was
imposed by these rules was the requirement that students desiring to attend integrated schools pay the cost of transportation. 23
By 1969, the Lubbock Independent School District (LISD) was
still significantly segregated, which led the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) to require that the
school district submit a workable desegregation plan. 24 In order
to fulfill this requirement, the LISD held open-community
meetings to discuss integration strategies. On August 19, 1970,
the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) Civil Rights
Division filed a suit against the LISD in the U.S. District Court
for the Northern District of Texas, alleging that the LISD had
maintained a segregated school system in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, and ordered the LISD to desegregate. 25
Unfortunately, there were road blocks to integration as tensions quickly arose between some of the students and between
some of their parents in the newly integrated schools. Tragically, within a few months of integration, a White student shot

19.
20.
21.
22.

United States v. Texas Ed. Agency, 600 F.2d 518, 520-21 (5th Cir. 1979).

Id.
Id.

BEHNKEN, FIGHTING THEIR OWN BATTLES: MEXICAN
AND THE STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS IN TEXAS, 146-47 (2011).

AMERICANS, BLACKS,

23. See id. at 147.
24. Id.
25. United States v. Texas Ed. Agency, 600 F.2d 518, 520 (5th Cir. 1979).
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and killed a Black student in class. 26 This event created a riot in
which students and parents engaged in physical altercations in
schools and shots were fired culminating in a “mass exodus” of
both White and Latino students from the integrated schools. 27
Thus, after only a short period of integration, the LISD and
Lubbock as a whole “resegregated as quickly as it had integrated.” 28
Despite the failure of the LISD to comply with courtordered desegregation, no further legal action was taken until
the spring of 1977 when the LISD applied to the district court
for permission to build new schools in the district. 29 At that
time, Lubbock’s student population was 59.4% White, 27.3%
Mexican-American, and 12.6% Black. 30 Despite a majority
White population, the minority students in Lubbock were confined to schools with large minority populations and with high
poverty rates. 31 The “Black schools” were segregated on every
level of primary and secondary education in Dunbar High
School, Struggs Junior High School, and Iles and Wheatley Elementary Schools. 32 Meanwhile, the Guadalupe School—
previously termed the “Mexican School”—had retained the majority of Latino students. 33 “The [district] court found that the
minority status of the Guadalupe Elementary School and of the
all-Black schools built on or near the site of the old Dunbar
Schools (Dunbar High School, Struggs Junior High School,
and Iles and Wheatley Elementary Schools) was the result of
School Board action.” 34 Furthermore, “[i]t found that even after

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

BEHNKEN, supra note 22, at 212-13 n.26.
BEHNKEN, supra note 22, at 213.

Id.

United States v. Texas Ed. Agency, 600 F.2d 518, 520 (5th Cir. 1979).

Id. at 521.
Id. at 520-21.
Id. at 521.
Id.
Id.
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De jure segregation ended, the School Board gerrymandered
the attendance zones for these schools to retain their minority
population.” 35
In order to determine the extent of existing segregation
in the LISD, the district court held an evidentiary hearing. 36 After the hearing, the district court found that only nine of the
LISD’s twenty-two “minority schools” were caused by the
LISD’s policies. 37 Thus, the district court entered an order requiring the LISD to desegregate the nine specified schools and
allowed the LISD to build new schools subject to the district
courts approval of the LISD’s desegregation plan for the nine
specified minority schools. 38 The DOJ appealed the district
court’s ruling to the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals based
on two primary arguments: (1) “the district court erred in holding that the racial composition of the minority schools not included in the desegregation order was not the product of
School Board action,” and (2) “the desegregation plan adopted
by the district court unfairly burden[ed] minority students.” 39
Upon appeal, the Fifth Circuit took issue with two aspects of the lower court’s orders. 40 The first point of disagreement was the fact that the district court only required nine of
the twenty-two schools to be desegregated, while it considered
the remaining segregation to be the result of “racially neutral
neighborhood school assignment plans.” 41 The district court
had incorrectly assumed that because the school boundaries
were based on the proximity of the students’ homes to the
schools, this was a “racially neutral” assignment. 42 The Fifth
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
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Circuit relied upon the important precedent of Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education (1970), during which
the U.S. Supreme Court had heard a similar argument, to
which it responded:
All things being equal, with no history of discrimination, it might well be desirable to assign
pupils to schools nearest their homes. But all
things are not equal in a system that has been deliberately constructed and maintained to enforce
racial segregation.
. . . “Racially neutral” assignment plans proposed
by school authorities to a district court may be
inadequate; such plans may fail to counteract the
continuing effects of past school segregation resulting from discriminatory location of school
sites or distortion of school size in order to
achieve or maintain an artificial racial separation.
When school authorities present a district court
with a “loaded game board,” affirmative action in
the form of remedial altering of attendance zones
is proper to achieve truly nondiscriminatory assignments. In short, an assignment plan is not acceptable simply because it appears to be neutral. 43
Thus, the Fifth Circuit acknowledged that because residential
segregation was an issue for Lubbock, school boundaries based
on housing patterns would only work to continue the pattern of
school segregation. 44 The court provided the following reasoning:

43. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Ed., 402 U.S. 1, 28 (U.S. 1971).
44. Texas Ed. Agency, 600 F.2d at 521.
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To treat a school located in an urban area as an
isolated unit free from the effects of acts taken
with regard to other schools in the district is unrealistic and contrary to the policy underlying the
progeny of Brown that the effects of intentional
segregation be eliminated “root and branch. 45
The second aspect of the district court’s order that the
Fifth Circuit found problematic was that it unjustly placed the
burden of proof upon the plaintiffs to prove that segregation
actually existed. 46 In making this decision, the appellate court
relied upon the precedent set by Keyes v. Denver (1973), 47
which had shifted the burden of proof from the plaintiffs to the
Denver School District to show that discriminatory policies did
not exist. 48 With the essential precedent of Keyes, the LISD
was not only guilty of de jure segregation but was also found
guilty of a number of more subversive de facto segregation
methods that led to further segregation: 49
The gerrymander of attendance zones and the
building of schools of certain sizes at certain locations, against the historic backdrop of a De jure
system of segregation of long standing, can have
the effect of designating certain schools as minority schools and of marking the areas of the city in
which those schools are located as minority areas.
Intentional school segregation in the past may
have been a factor in creating a natural environ45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
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ment for growth of further segregation. Thus, if
the respondent School Board cannot disprove
segregative intent, it can rebut the prima facie
case only by showing that its past segregative acts
did not create or contribute to the current segregated condition of the core city schools.
We could hold that any segregative effect caused
by an intentionally segregative act violates the
Constitution. 50
Thus, it became clear that the LISD had gerrymandered attendance zones across geographic boundaries, which had resulted in racially segregated schools due to the de facto residential segregation that existed throughout Lubbock. 51 These
actions by the school district exacerbated segregation to the
point that by 1978, of the 50 total schools in the district, 12
schools had minority (Black and Latino) populations exceeding
70%, while 19 had White populations greater than 70%. 52
Complicating the school segregation dynamic in the LISD is
that Black and Latino students were not only desegregated
from White students, but also from one another, thus further
exacerbating the tri-racial divide that was occurring on the
ground in Lubbock. 53 Desegregation, then, became a complex
matter of integrating all three groups of students into the same
schools. Astoundingly, twenty years after the Brown decision,
more than 60% of Lubbock’s schools maintained this extensive
tri-racial segregation. 54

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id. at 527.
Id. at 521.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 527.
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The Fifth Circuit also identified several other indirect
causes of segregation by the LISD, including: the use of optional attendance zones for White students to attend schools
outside of their area, the manipulation of bus routes to make integration more difficult, and the adjustment of school capacities
to allow more White students to concentrate in certain schools
while confining Black and Latino students into other schools. 55
Ultimately, the Fifth Circuit found the district court’s “conclusory statement that no [constitutional] violation had occurred at
the minority schools unaffected by the order, the district court
made no specific findings on the effects on the schools and on
Lubbock’s housing patterns of the intentional segregative acts it
found the School Board had committed.” 56 Thus, the case was
remanded to the district for further findings of fact to determine “how much ‘incremental segregative effect’ the School
Board’s intentional discriminatory acts had on the residential
distribution of the Lubbock school population” as “compared
to what [the residential distribution] would have been in the absence of such intentional segregative acts. 57 The Fifth Circuit
stated held that upon remand, any “segregative effect caused by
an intentionally segregative act” would be held to violate the
Constitution. 58
Despite the judicial intervention in the LISD in the
1970’s, the LISD has continued to suffer from the effects of de
facto residential segregation. This continued de facto segregation is highlighted in the next section.

55.
56.
57.
58.
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B. Students in Lubbock Today
The following table (Table 1) shows the demographic
and socioeconomic makeup of (1) the Lubbock Independent
School District’s (LISD) as a whole, (2) Lubbock High Schools,
and (3) Lubbock Middle Schools. The bolded percentages show
disproportionate rates of non-White and White students and
subsequent rates of economically disadvantaged and at-risk students.

Table 1: Demographic Makeup of LISD

Entity

“African
American”
Population

“Hispanic”
Population

“White”
Population

“Economically
Disadvantaged”
Students

“At-risk”
Students 59

LISD 60

13.5%

59.2%

23.2%

66.8%

45.8%

Lubbock High Schools

Coronado
High
School 61
Estacado
High 62
School
Lubbock
High
School 63

12%

51.1%

32.9%

46.9%

41.9%

48.5%

47.3%

2.5%

89.7 %

65.5%

5.6%

61.8%

24.8%

44%

33.8%

59. About the Data, THE TEXAS TRIBUNE, https://schools.texastribune.org/about/#atrisk (last visited February 23, 2019) (providing the Texas Education Agency’s definition of “atrisk” students).
60. Lubbock ISD, THE TEXAS TRIBUNE, https://schools.texastribune.org/districts/
lubbock-isd/ (last visited February 23, 2019).
61. Coronado High School, THE TEXAS TRIBUNE, https://schools.texastribune.org/
districts/lubbock-isd/coronado-high-school/ (last visited February 23, 2019).
62. Estacado High School, THE TEXAS TRIBUNE, https://schools.texastribune.org
/districts/lubbock-isd/estacado-high-school/ (last visited February 23, 2019).
63. Lubbock High School, THE TEXAS TRIBUNE, https://schools.texastribune.org
/districts/lubbock-isd/lubbock-high-school/ (last visited February 23, 2019).
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High
School 64

11.8%

58.6%

[2019
26.4%

54.1%

46.3%

Lubbock Middle Schools

Atkins
Middle
School 65
Cavazos
Middle
School 66
Dunbar
Middle
School 67
Evans
Middle
School 68
Irons
Middle
School 69
Mackenzie
Middle
School 70

13.7%

74.4%

10.1%

81.6%

62.5%

4.5%

91.6%

2.6%

92%

63.5%

53.4%

43.3%

1.7%

89.3%

78.6%

10.5%

47.5%

38.2%

45.6%

35.8%

6.6%

38.7%

49.8%

39.7%

34.4%

14.3%

60.6%

21.4%

68.2%

50.8%

64. Monterey High School, THE TEXAS TRIBUNE, https://schools.texastribune.org/
districts/lubbock-isd/monterey-high-school/ (last visited February 23, 2019).
65. Atkins Middle School, THE TEXAS TRIBUNE, https://schools.texastribune.org
/districts/lubbock-isd/atkins-middle-school/ (last visited February 23, 2019).
66. Cavazos Middle School, THE TEXAS TRIBUNE, https://schools.texastribune.org/
districts/lubbock-isd/cavazos-middle-school/ (last visited February 23, 2019).
67. Dunbar Middle School, THE TEXAS TRIBUNE, https://schools.texastribune.org/
districts/lubbock-isd/dunbar-middle-school/ (last visited February 23, 2019). (Dunbar is somewhat of an anomaly as it was established as a historical “Black” high school, initially started to
help black students attend college during the time of de jure racial discriminatory laws).
68. Evans Middle School, THE TEXAS TRIBUNE, https://schools.texastribune.org
/districts/lubbock-isd/evans-middle-school/ (last visited February 23, 2019).
69. Irons Middle School, THE TEXAS TRIBUNE, https://schools.texastribune.org
/districts/lubbock-isd/irons-middle-school/ (last visited February 23, 2019).
70. Mackenzie Middle School, THE TEXAS TRIBUNE, https://schools.texastribune.org/
districts/lubbock-isd/mackenzie-middle-school/ (last visited February 23, 2019).
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15%

68.6%

14.2%

89.5%

58.6%

13.3%

78.3%

6%

90.1%

70.6%

Table 1 lists all of the LISD’s high schools and middle
schools, and the percentages of “African American,” “Hispanic
(or Latino),” and “White” students by school as compared to
the LISD as a whole, and the percentage of “Economically Disadvantaged” and “At-risk” students in each school as compared
to the LISD as a whole. The LISD has 13.5% African American/Black students, 59.2% Hispanic/Latino students, and
23.2% White/Caucasian students, with 66.8% of the students
as economically disadvantaged and 45.8% of the its students
considered “at risk.” 73 While most of Lubbock’s high schools
have fairly proportionate demographics compared to the LISD
as a whole, Estacado High School has disproportionately higher
rates of non-White students (48.5% African American students
and 47.3% Hispanic students) compared to White students
(2.5% White students). Furthermore, Estacado High School’s
rate of economically disadvantaged students is 89.7% and its
rate of at-risk students is 65.5% (which are nearly double the
rates of students in the same categories in Lubbock High
School). The effect of de facto segregation becomes even more
apparent when comparing Lubbock’s middles schools, which

71. Slaton Middle School, THE TEXAS TRIBUNE, https://schools.texastribune.org
/districts/lubbock-isd/slaton-middle-school/ (last visited February 23, 2019).
Wilson
Middle
School,
THE
TEXAS
TRIBUNE,
72. Smylie
https://schools.texastribune.org/districts/lubbock-isd/smylie-wilson-middle-school/ (last visited
February 23, 2019).
73. About the Data, THE TEXAS TRIBUNE, https://schools.texastribune.org/about/#atrisk (last visited February 23, 2019) (providing the Texas Education Agency’s definition of “atrisk” students).
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are located in smaller areas of the city. All of Lubbock’s middle
schools (with the exception of Mackenzie Middle School) have
disproportionate numbers of non-White and White students,
and, subsequently, higher rates of economically disadvantaged
and at-risk students. Therefore, higher rates of de facto segregation between White and non-White students directly correlate with higher rates of “economically disadvantaged” and “atrisk” students. 74
The damage done by racial segregation is further
demonstrated by lower high school graduation rates and lower
bachelor’s degree attainment among racial and ethnic minority
students in Lubbock. The high school graduation rate is 9.31%
lower for Black students than for white students, and 24.73%
lower for Latino students than for White students. 75 Furthermore, college bachelor-degree attainment rates for White students are 40.11%, compared to only 11.45% for Black students
and 11.93% for Latino students. 76 While there are several factors that determine high school graduation rates and bachelordegree attainment for students, and causation is difficult to establish with certainty, the rates represented above can be interpreted as some evidence of the effect of racial and socioeconomic de facto segregation in schools. 77

74. See Lubbock Independent School District, PROPUBLICA, Miseducation (2017)
https://projects.propublica.org/miseducation/district/4828500 (identifying LISD as a district
with high rates of segregation, achievement disparity, discipline disparity, and opportunity disparity between White and non-White students).
75. Lubbock Population, WORLD POPULATION REVIEW (June 12, 2018),
http://worldpopulationreview.com/us-cities/lubbock/.
76. Id.
77. See generally Richard Rothstein, For Public Schools, Segregation Then, Segregation Since: Education and the Unfinished March, ECON. POLICY INST., 5–15 (2013),
http://www.epi.org/files/2013/Unfinished-March-School-Segregation.pdf; Aaron Williams, et
al., America is more diverse than ever — but still segregated, THE WASH. POST (May 10,
2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2018/national/segregation-us-cities/?utm_
term=.f8da453776d1; Mario L. Barnes, et. al., A Post-Race Equal Protection?, 98 GEO. L.J.
967, 988–91 (2010).
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With the case study of Lubbock’s history as an important contextual preface, the next section of this legal note
analyzes how race and the law have grown together and influenced the judicial interpretation of racial issues in the United
States.
III.RACE AND THE LAW
As the renowned historian Winthrop Jordan so eloquently stated: “It is now clear that mankind is a single biological species; that races are neither discrete nor stable units but
rather that they are plastic, changing, integral parts of a whole
which is itself changing.” 78 Thus, in a sense, race is not a scientific truth based in biological evidence (despite past attempts by
eugenicists to “prove” race). 79 As one racial historian stated:
“. . .race is not a scientific fact but a social,
cultural, and ideological ‘construction’—a set of
ideas—through which societies have sought to
organize, structure, and understand themselves. . . . [S]ocieties have used ideas about race
to reserve wealth and power for those members
defined as ‘white’ and to deny those goods to
members defined as ‘black’ and ‘brown.’” 80
Despite the fluctuating nature of “race” as social concept, throughout the history of the United States the Supreme

78. WINTHROP D. JORDAN, THE WHITE MAN’S BURDEN; HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF
RACISM IN THE UNITED STATES, ix-xii (Oxford Univ. Press, 1974).
79. Howard Markel, Column: The false, racist theory of eugenics once ruled science.
Let’s never let that happen again, PBS (Feb. 16, 2018), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/
column-the-false-racist-theory-of-eugenics-once-ruled-science-lets-never-let-that-happenagain.
80. GEORGE REID ANDREWS, AFRO-LATIN AMERICA, 1800-2000, 6 (Oxford Univ.
Press, 1st ed. 2004).
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Court has employed a “background rule” of race as a biological
reality in its race-law jurisprudence. 81 While the background
rule has remained intact, the Court has added and modified
various “foreground rules” to change its approach to race-law
interpretation. 82 The Court’s approach is best categorized as
three phases of judicial interpretation: (1) Classic Liberal, (2)
Modern Liberal (“Colorblind”), and (3) Neoliberal (“Postracial”). 83

A. Phase 1: Classic Liberal

Race was established as a social, economic, political, and
legal reality by imperialist European nations and their colonies,
to justify the oppression and colonization of non-Europeans. 84
Thus, the biological construction of race was first developed by
European nations and then imported to its colonies as an overarching social construct, or “background rule.” 85 Furthermore,
European colonies and their nations developed various local
laws to reify the biological concept of race into their respective
legal systems. 86 Thus, the overarching background rule of race
as a biological concept existed in the North American colonies
for centuries before the advent of the United States under a
unified constitution. 87

81. See Justin Desautels-Stein, Race as a Legal Concept, 2 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 1, 4,
42 (2012).
82. Id. at 5. (defining foreground rules as “those rules believed to be responsive to a
pre-existing activity. . . [which] regulate, manage, and control”).
83. Id. at 4-5.
84. See MARTHA MENCHACA, RECOVERING HISTORY, CONSTRUCTING RACE: THE
INDIAN, BLACK, AND WHITE ROOTS OF MEXICAN AMERICANS, 10–20 (Univ. of Tex. Press,
2001); RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE; THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF
EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY, 32 (Alfred A. Knopf, 1st ed.
1994).
85. Desautels-Stein, supra note 81, at 3 (citations omitted).
86. Id.
87. See GEORGE REID ANDREWS, AFRO-LATIN AMERICA, 1800-2000, 6 (Oxford Univ.
Press, 1st ed. 2004).
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The construction of race-law during the United States’
first two centuries of existence was primarily a continuation of
the overtly racist background rule imported from Europe. 88 Despite the turmoil caused by legalized racism, which culminated
in the Civil War, the Court continued its overtly racist approach to judicial interpretation by allowing a system of state
laws to develop based on the “separate but equal” legal theory
in Plessy v. Ferguson, until the mid-twentieth century. 89 This
period of judicial race-law interpretation is referred to as the
“Classic Liberal” phase. 90
In the decades leading up to the Civil War, the nation
faced challenges caused by rapid changes in the economic and
social structure of the United States. A rapid influx of immigration and territorial expansion into what became the American
Southwest forced the American electorate to face the question
of slavery in the wake of the Compromise of 1850. 91 It was during this politically tumultuous time, in 1857, that the background rule of race as a biological construction was formally
entrenched in the federal legal system by the U.S. Supreme
Court. 92 In its now infamous Dred Scott decision, the Court
wrote “that neither the class of persons who had been imported
as slaves, nor their descendants, whether they had become free
or not, were then acknowledged as a part of the people” and
“had no rights which the white man was bound to respect.” 93
88. See generally Desautels-Stein, supra note 81, at 18-20.
89. Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, Resurrecting the Promise of Brown: Understanding
and Remedying How the Supreme Court Reconstitutionalized Segregated Schools, 88 N.C. L.
REV. 787, 834 (2010).
90. Desautels-Stein, supra note 81, at 3.
91. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407 (1857), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. See also Melvin I. Urofsky, Compromise of
1850, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, (February 4, 2019), https://www.britannica.com/event/
Compromise-of-1850; Desautels-Stein, supra note 81, at 7.
92. RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE; THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF
EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY, 32 (Alfred A. Knopf, 1st ed.
1994).
93. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 407 (emphasis added).
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Three years after Dred Scott, the nation broke out into
the Civil War, leading to the end of slavery and the ratification
of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to
the Constitution. Despite these inroads, the biological background rule of race remained the foundation of race jurisprudence in the United States. 94 Despite slavery being outlawed,
Southern states immediately established a system of laws to
continue its oppression of Blacks, which were quickly sanctioned by the Court. 95
Just eighteen years after the end of the Civil War, in the
Civil Rights Cases, and later in Plessy v. Ferguson, the Court
began asserting “post-race-like principles,” as it “interpret[ed]
the scope of the Reconstruction Amendments.” 96 In fact, constitutional legal experts have noted that while the Court could
hardly discount the importance of race in the decades after the
Civil War, “the language and the reasoning that the Court employed in its opinions to justify both racial segregation and the
limited use of the law as an affirmative mechanism for change
were decidedly post-racial in that the Court’s analysis denied
the continuing significance of past racial oppression and the
ongoing presence of racism.” 97 Thus, the Court “attempted to
negate the importance of race, alternatively finding it to be either of no moment or a legitimate basis to segregate.” 98

B. The Modern Liberal “Colorblind” Phase
The Modern Liberal phase is essential in understanding
that the legal concept of race was not only reinforced by the

94.
95.
96.
(2010).
97.
98.

116

Desautels-Stein, supra note 81, at 4.
KLUGER, supra note 92, at 31-42.
Mario L. Barnes, et. al., A Post-Race Equal Protection?, 98 GEO. L.J. 967, 969

Id. at 969–70.
Id. at 969.
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Supreme Court’s use of race to justify harmful laws (e.g.
Plessy), but also by its attempt to undo the damage of those
laws (e.g. Brown). 99 Thus, instead of eliminating the background rule of race as a biological reality, the Court added
foreground rules to address the damage that was caused by racial categorization. 100 Even the so-called “colorblind” approach
by the Court jurists was rooted in the idea of race as a biological concept. 101 The difference was that the modern liberal approach was to establish foreground rules (e.g. the civil rights
statutes established in the second half of the twentieth century)
based on race in order to regulate the old background rules.
Some researchers have identified “race” not as something built into a person’s DNA, but is instead a social categorization. 102 The Court identified racism as “prejudice against discrete and insular minorities” and as a “special condition, which
tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and
which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial
inquiry.”103 Thus, by the Supreme Court’s use of “discrete,”
“insular,” to reinforce the biological construct of race, the Supreme Court reified the biological concept of race, which laid
the foundation for the foreground rule of “strict scrutiny” decidedly established in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena. 104
The springboard of the Modern Liberal phase of judicial
interpretation was Brown v. Board of Education, decided in

99. Desautels-Stein, supra note 81, at 5-6.
100. Id. at 5-6.
101. Id. at 5-7.
102. See WINTHROP D. JORDAN, THE WHITE MAN’S BURDEN; HISTORICAL ORIGINS
OF RACISM IN THE UNITED STATES, ix-xii (Oxford Univ. Press, 1974); GEORGE REID
ANDREWS, AFRO-LATIN AMERICA, 1800-2000, 6 (Oxford Univ. Press, 1st ed. 2004).
103. United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152, n. 4 (1938) (emphasis added); See also Desautels-Stein, supra note 81, at 40-41.
104. See Desautels-Stein, supra note 81, at 43; See also Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995).

117

SMITH_MACROS.DOCM (DO NOT DELETE)

4/10/2019 12:18 PM

BYU Education & Law Journal

[2019

1954. 105 This case explicitly recognized the damage done by a
system of separate public schools for children of White and
Black children, and that this per se disadvantaged Black students. Later, the Civil Rights Amendment of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 solidified federal protections for Blacks,
and the Court began enforcing desegregation efforts. 106
These civil protections, however, were not extended to
Latino students until the Court’s decision in Keyes v. Denver
School District decision in 1971. 107 This delay in extending civil
rights protections to Latinos was due to the complex history of
Latinos attempting to “pass” as legally “White” for several decades, but being discriminated against as a “White” underclass
nonetheless. 108 Historian Brian Behnken describes this phenomenon as follows:
Mexican Americans throughout the twentieth
century had done a great deal to convince Anglos
that they were white. In many cases, Anglos resisted. In the Chicano movement, Mexican
Americans had to go to great lengths to convince
whites of their brownness. Interestingly, Anglos
resisted reclassifying Chicanos, preferring instead
to categorize them as white so they could use
them as integration’s ‘pawns, puppets, and scapegoats.’ In the 1940s and 1950s whiteness had offered Latinos the best chance for ending racism.
In the 1960s and 1970s, brownness became the
best hope for doing so. 109

105.
106.
107.
108.

See Desautels-Stein, supra note 81, at 4.
See generally Desautels-Stein, supra note 81, at 40-41.
See Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 413 U.S. 189, 197 (1973).

BEHNKEN, FIGHTING THEIR OWN BATTLES: MEXICAN
AND THE STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS IN TEXAS, 4 (2011).
109. Id. at 206.
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Thus, the school districts involved in Keyes in Denver attempted to comply with court-ordered desegregation by defining Latino students as “White” and putting all the Black and Latino
students in the same schools, while leaving White students in
their own schools. 110 Thus, the Court utilized the same Modern
Liberal (Colorblind) approach to Latinos.
While the Court’s Modern Liberal (Colorblind) approach allowed the Court to identify and protect the constitutional rights of racial minorities by adding foreground rules to
judicial interpretation, the approach still relied upon the background rule of race as a biological reality. By retaining the
background rule, the Court allowed the future argument to be
undercut by post-racialist rhetoric. 111

C. Phase Three: Neoliberal Post-racialism
In contrast to modern liberalism, neo liberalism is hostile to the foreground rules of race. 112 Neoliberal proponents
are “notoriously hostile to the use of foreground rules, claiming
that racial dynamics in the United States have progressed to the
point where much of equal protection jurisprudence is actually
fostering racial discrimination instead of remedying it. It is in
this sense that this most recent phase is post-racial. 113 Neoliberal proponents have also turned the principle of “colorblindness”
on its head in the context of equal protection interpretation. 114
Because the Neoliberal ideology takes racial classifications to be

110.
(1973).
111.
(2010).
112.
(2012).
113.
114.

Id. at 198. See also Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 413 U.S. 189, 197
Mario L. Barnes, et. al., A Post-Race Equal Protection?, 98 GEO. L.J. 967, 972
Justin Desautels-Stein, Race as a Legal Concept, 2 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 1, 5–6

Id. (citations omitted).
Id.
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a biological reality instead of a man-made construct, “the postracial view of colorblindness makes the claim that because race
is a natural, pre-political sphere of human identity, it is wrong
for the state to make regulations on the basis of racial identity.” 115
Those who assert the myth of post-racialism essentially
state that in society, “overt individual discrimination has
waned” sufficiently so that judicial intervention is no longer
necessary; yet, the reality is that “institutional and structural
barriers still result in disparate life outcomes along racial
lines.” 116 The problem with post-racialism is that it ignores the
continued issues caused by the United States’ racist past. 117 It
also perpetuates ignorance of current issues of racism by creating a “revised understanding of equality, one that will result in a
significant change in constitutional race jurisprudence.” 118
Indeed, the very reactionary rhetoric used by the Supreme Court in the last three decades is similar to the language
perpetuated by the Court during the Reconstruction Era in the
decades after the Civil War—the time when overt legalized racism became entrenched in U.S. law apart from slavery. 119 It is
this Neoliberal myth of post-racialism that led to the demise of
school desegregation litigation, and which has allowed the resurgence of de facto school segregation in urban centers. 120
There were two primary cases that relied on the myth of
post-racialism and which marked the end of court-mandated
desegregation: Board of Education v. Dowell (1991) and Free115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id. at 6.

Barnes, supra note 111, at 972.
Id. at 967–68.
Id. at 969.
Id.
See generally Erwin Chemerinsky, The Segregation and Resegregation of American
Public Education: The Courts’ Role, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1597 (2003); Gary Orfield, Schools More
Separate: Consequences of a Decade of Resegregation, (The Civil Rights Project: Harvard
Univ., 2001) https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED459217.pdf. See Justin Desautels-Stein, Race
As A Legal Concept, 2 COLUM. J. RACE & L., 42–50 (2012).
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man v. Pitts (1992). These two cases established three ambigu-

ous requirements before a school district could be relinquished
from court-mandated segregation: (1) the school district must
have complied with all aspects of the court’s desegregation order; (2) the school district had to be able to maintain desegregation without additional judicial intervention; and (3) the school
district had to prove to the previously disfavored race its “good
faith” commitment that it had complied with the court desegregation order. 121 Ultimately, the desegregation came to an end
with Missouri v. Jenkins 1995. 122 In that case, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down “desegregation attractiveness,” or
magnet, programs, which had previously been an essential prescription of court orders. 123 Even worse was the court’s decision
to reduce the standard of desegregation compliance from
Green’s prescription of eliminating racial discrimination both
“root and branch,” to merely requiring school districts to eliminate “the vestiges of past discrimination . . . to the extent practicable” demonstrated by a vague “good-faith commitment to
the whole of the court’s decree and to those provisions of the
law . . . that were the predicate for judicial intervention in the
first instance.” 124

1. The Neoliberal myth of post-racialism has led to the demise
of school segregation litigation despite continued discrimination
The federal judiciary was not the only government
branch to succumb to the myth of post-racialism. The 1964
121. See Charles T. Clotfelter, Public School Segregation in Metropolitan Areas,
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH (1998), http://www.nber.org/papers/
w6779.pdf; Barnes, supra note 111, at 989.
122. Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 150 (1995).
123. Id.
124. Board of Ed. of Oklahoma City Public Schools v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 249–250
(1991).
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Civil Rights Act is an important starting point in understanding
how integration policy failed to meet the needs of people of
color. The initial Civil Rights Act “required the Office of Education to investigate school districts that failed to integrate.” 125
In order to prevent Southern members of Congress from striking the act down, the Johnson administration diluted this part
of the policy. Instead, the plan was for the Office of Education
to ask regional attorneys in highly segregated areas to report
any instances of resistance to integration. 126
In 1964, the Office of Education commissioned a leading sociologist, James Coleman, to conduct the survey. Coleman analyzed—based on a 600,000 student sample survey 127—
student and family attitudes as well as their social and economic
circumstances. The survey also included a math and reading
test for the students. The result of the survey was that there was
not a large correlation gap between resource disparities and racial achievement. 128 Rather, economic disparity and the level of
education of parents had a greater effect upon the success of
students. 129 As such, the survey found that the fact that Blacks
were economically marginalized was the primary damaging factor in poor student success. 130 Therefore, integration policies
only benefited Black students if they were integrated into
schools with middle class families. Thus, it became clear that in
order to improve student achievement, both the racial and the
socioeconomic situation of Blacks had to be addressed.

125. Richard Rothstein, For Public Schools, Segregation Then, Segregation Since: Education and the Unfinished March, ECON. POLICY INST., 3 (2013), http://www.epi.org/files/

2013/Unfinished-March-School-Segregation.pdf.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. See Charles T. Clotfelter, Public School Segregation in Metropolitan Areas,
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH (1998), http://www.nber.org/papers/
w6779.pdf.
129. See id.
130. See id.
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Unfortunately, the Johnson Administration succumbed
to political pressures and downplayed the Coleman report to
ensure that they could move their agenda forward in the Elementary and Secondary Education Act. 131 As a result, instead of
emphasizing economic and class integration of neighborhoods
through federal subsidies, the Johnson Administration focused
on putting money into fruitless efforts to improve central city
neighborhoods. A similar failure occurred with the Nixon Administration. Initially, the Department of Housing and Urban
Development, led by George Romney, agreed to withhold
funds from White suburbs who refused to subsidize lowermiddle-income and low-income public housing for Black families. 132 This policy, however, caused a rift in the Nixon Administration. 133 The opponents to housing integration eventually
won out on the argument that Nixon would lose too many conservative supporters. 134 Nixon denounced federal interference in
local housing authority disputes, and his selection of federal
court judges essentially eradicated the last major push for economic integration in bettering the lives of marginalized racial
minorities. 135
Furthermore, in the early 1970s the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) was established to provide an overall indication of how students were doing both intellectually and emotionally. 136 The assessment was very
comprehensive at the outset, but with funding cuts it was reduced to a basic in-school written reading and math test. 137 As

131. Richard Rothstein, For Public Schools, Segregation Then, Segregation Since: Education and the Unfinished March, ECON. POLICY INST., 4 (2013), http://www.epi.org/files/
2013/Unfinished-March-School-Segregation.pdf.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 5.
135. Id.
136. See id. at 5.
137. See id. at 5-6.
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such, policy was overwhelmingly focused on the numbers that
students produce, and was based on the premise that increasing
school resources would boost test scores rather than addressing
the actual needs of students. 138 This misuse of benchmarks to
achieve greater funding instead of helping students has continued to the present day, as many educational policy-makers and
high-level administrators continue to use a backwards theory of
cognitive development in creating educational policy. 139 Many
post-racialists argue that if children merely get the education
that they need, then they will escape poverty. 140 Thus, many
educational reformers focus only upon improving school resources and teachers, claiming that this alone will solve the
problem of the student achievement gap and racial isolation. 141
This ignores the pattern of intergenerational poverty and the
external economic climate. 142 Former New York City Mayor
Michael Bloomberg summarized the all too familiar post-racial
argument of today when he said, “a lot of what Dr. King wanted to accomplish in our society will take care of itself” if schools
improve. 143 This echoes the apathy of post-racialists, who have
allowed “racial fatigue” 144 to blind—and sometimes willfully
so—leaders who convince themselves and their constituents of
the great post-racial myth: that “[r]acism is not the norm, and

138. See id. at 17.
139. See id.; See Mario L. Barnes, et. al., A Post-Race Equal Protection?, 98 GEO. L.J.
967, 980-992 (2010).
140. See Barnes, supra note 139.
141. See MARGUERITE L. SPENCER, ET AL, THE BENEFITS OF RACIAL AND ECONOMIC
INTEGRATION IN OUR EDUCATION SYSTEM: WHY THIS MATTERS FOR OUR DEMOCRACY,
9-11 (Kirwan Inst. for the Study of Race and Ethnicity: Ohio State Univ. 2009); Barnes, supra
note 139.
142. See Richard Kahlenberg, The Return of Separate but Equal, in INEQUALITY
MATTERS: THE GROWING ECONOMIC DIVIDE IN AMERICA AND ITS POISONOUS
CONSEQUENCES, 55-64 (James Lardner & David A. Smith eds., 2005).
143. Richard Rothstein, For Public Schools, Segregation Then, Segregation Since: Education and the Unfinished March, ECON. POLICY INST., 16 (2013), http://www.epi.org/files/
2013/Unfinished-March-School-Segregation.pdf.
144. Barnes, supra note 139, at 976, 979.
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that which remains is limited to the random, isolated acts of
bigots.” 145 This is not so.
While the United States, as a whole, has become more
racially integrated since 1990, many of the nation’s major urban
areas have experienced an increase in de facto residential, and
subsequently school segregation. In fact, in large metropolitan
areas, minority students are often more concentrated in schools
with peers of the same race than they were during the active integration movement of the 1970’s. 146 Researcher Richard Rothstein points to economic disparity between White and racial
minority families as the primary culprit for concentrations of
minorities in low-income neighborhoods, and subsequently in
the schools to which those neighborhoods are assigned. 147
Moreover, as education funding is often tied to the local
tax base of the families within school districts, and Latino and
Black students are disproportionately concentrated in neighborhoods with lower incomes, these students attend schools
that are increasingly segregated in the sense that they consistently have less educational funds. 148 To make matters more
complicated, the Court refuses to recognize education as a fundamental right, and only reviews claims of discrimination based
on socioeconomic status under the lower standard of “rational
basis” review. 149 Thus, many Latino and Black families become
trapped in the vicious cycle of intergenerational poverty, lower
high school and college graduation rates, and lower rates of income accumulation. 150
145. Barnes, supra note 139, at 998.
146. Rothstein, supra note 143, at 13; See also Aaron Williams, et al., America is more
diverse than ever — but still segregated, THE WASH. POST (May 10, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2018/national/segregation-uscities/?utm_term=.
2f43738ba56f.
147. Rothstein, supra note 143, at 16-17.
148. Barnes, supra note 139, at 989. See generally Kahlenberg, supra note 135.
149. Barnes, supra note 139, at 993-94 (citing San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-35 (1972)).
150. Barnes, supra note 139, at 989 (citations omitted).
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Effective education today cannot come from meeting
the bare minimum requirements and only teaching students the
state-sanctioned curriculum to meet a threshold for test scores.
Rather, students need material that they can connect with. For
some students, this most effectively comes through bilingual or
dual immersion programs. For others, they desire material that
applies to their specific culture that is so often minimized in the
White-centric literature that is most commonly used in primary
and secondary education. Professor Emdin recently discussed
the importance of teaching to the needs of students. 151 He discussed education and equity, asserting that equity is not
achieved merely by providing students with what administrators
and state school board members recommend. 152 Instead, equitable education involves counseling with parents and teachers in
order to give students the educational experience that they truly
need to be successful. 153
Residential and school segregation continue to hinder
United States social and economic progress. 154 As will be discussed in the next section, the law will continue to be an ineffective remedy to prevent individual discrimination in the
United States until the Court allows local schools to remedy
the effects of past race-based discrimination.

2. Parents Involved: The Epitome of Neoliberal Post-racialism
Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle pro-

vides the quintessential example of Neoliberal post-racial rhetoric in the twenty-first century: “Writing for the majority,
151. Reality Pedagogy: Christopher Emdin at TEDx Teachers College, YOUTUBE (Aug
23, 2012), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2Y9tVf_8fqo (accessed September 3, 2018).
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. See MARGUERITE L. SPENCER, ET AL, THE BENEFITS OF RACIAL AND ECONOMIC
INTEGRATION IN OUR EDUCATION SYSTEM: WHY THIS MATTERS FOR OUR DEMOCRACY,
4-11 (Kirwan Inst. for the Study of Race and Ethnicity: Ohio State Univ. 2009).
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Chief Justice Roberts repeated the constitutional mantra:
whenever a public actor administers a racial classification, it will
be viewed with strict scrutiny. . .” 155 Strict scrutiny is the highest standard in civil litigation and cases only survive constitutional review “when it serves a strong social need and it has
been articulated in the narrowest of ways.” 156 Thus, even
though the Seattle school districts were seeking to promote racial integration, diversity, and provide more opportunities for
students of each racial background to benefit from shared experiences, the Court struck the school district’s remedial integration plan down because it was not “narrowly” tailored. 157
The Court’s majority opinion in Parents Involved is an
instructive example of how the Supreme Court continues to
hide behind pretended neutrality by taking a hard “colorblind”
approach—even to important state and local programs which
remedy the damage of past legalized racism. Chief Justice Roberts’ statement is the quintessential post-racial argument of
“false universalism,” which asserts that every person is born on
equal ground and “requires no state-provided advantage.” 158
This allows the Court to avoid remedying past damage in the
name of interpreting the “original” intention of the Constitution to limit the judiciary’s powers. But, as has already been discussed at length in this paper, the original intention of the
Constitution and the power granted to the judicial branch was
distorted by the background rule employed in the Dred Scott
decisions. 159

155. Justin Desautels-Stein, Race as a Legal Concept, 2 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 1, 46
(2012).
156. Id. at 47.
157. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 726
(2007).
158. Mario L. Barnes, et. al., A Post-Race Equal Protection?, 98 GEO. L.J. 967, 972
(2010) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
159. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407 (1857), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
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To continue to take a hard “colorblind” approach to
remedial programs in the context of false universalism is a poor
justification for avoiding judicial remedies in promoting civil
rights. In fact, the Court contradicts itself: while the Court
purports to hold fast to “colorblind” decisions, the court never
once questioned the concept of race itself. 160 Instead, the Court
held on to the fundamental background rule that has existed
since the nation’s founding: that race is a biological reality.
If the Court had truly relied upon a “race-neutral” decision, the Court should not have merely relied upon its Grutter
decision and continued the façade of “colorblindness.” 161 This is
especially true as Grutter dealt with a public institution of
higher education (and a selective law school at that), whereas
Parents Involved dealt with public primary and secondary
schools. Furthermore, Professor Desautels-Stein explains how
questions, which are essential in utilizing true race-neutral judicial interpretation, were never addressed by the Court in Grutter: “[i]f the law school had decided to challenge [the claimant’s] standing” and “argue that she had not been injured by the
policy because she had failed to prove she was ‘White,’ what
forms of proof would have satisfied the Court? ‘Cultural performance’? As long as these sorts of standing questions are left
in abeyance, decisions like Grutter and Parents Involved are
able to proceed.” 162 Desautels-Stein further notes the “dramatic
shift in the jurisprudence away from a focus on racism and towards a focus on ethnic or cultural diversity” that “was picked
up and hammered home in Grutter and Parents Involved.” 163
This shift in race jurisprudence has caused a difficult problem
“where we still have urgent needs in repairing the social effects
of neo-racism,” but “courts have taught themselves to gaze
160.
161.
162.
163.

128

See Desautels-Stein, supra note 155, at 48-49.
See Desautels-Stein, supra note 155, at 48.
Id. at 44.
Id. at 53-54.
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elsewhere: into the hazy shade of a diverse and politically safe
multicultural landscape.” 164 Consequently, the Court’s shift
from acknowledging race at all does not function to address
contemporary racism; rather, it ignores reality and deflects the
court’s attention from addressing discrimination in the United
States today. 165 Thus, “the jurist needs to understand how calls
for racial diversity have persistently obscured calls for racial justice.” 166
Instead of following the conflicted opinion expressed in
Grutter, the Court in Parents Involved could have utilized a caveat like that expressed by the district court in Ortiz v. Bank of
America:
I begin with the fact most widely agreed upon by
modern biologists, anthropologists, and other
students of human diversity. The notion of race
is a taxonomic device and, as with all such constructs, it exists in the human mind not as a division in the objective universe. 167
Thus, if the Court in Parents Involved had undertaken true
race-neutral judicial interpretation, the Court would have challenged the very concept of race to be defined by local school
district. Even more disturbing than the majority’s determination to hold onto a false sense of constitutional originalism is
Chief Justice Robert’s criticism of the notion that racial diversity and integration actually have benefits. In spite of the fact that
there exist many benefits of diversity in education, 168 Roberts
164.
165.
166.
167.
1982)).
168.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 49 (quoting Ortiz v. Bank of America, 547 F. Supp. 550, 565, (E. D. Cal.

See generally, Daryl G. Smith & Natalie B. Schonfeld, The Benefits of Diversity:
What the Research Tells Us, 5 ABOUT CAMPUS, no. 5, 16 (2000).
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glosses over the amicus briefs supporting such diversity
measures. 169 In sum, Professor Desautels-Stein explains the
Court’s neoliberal approach expressed in Parents Involved as
follows:
Though Roberts hardly is explicit about the racial question (as very few court decisions are),
the Parents analytical framework clearly presumes that the kind of thinking about race
in Ortiz was wrong-headed. School boards in Seattle and Louisville sought to better integrate
certain high schools, presumably on the belief
that there is something valuable about the idea of
racially integrated schools. That value might consist in all sorts of things, ranging from anti-racist
attacks on the Racial Contract, to utilitarian arguments in favor of everyone being better off
when more kinds of people are in contact with
one another, to the desires to do justice with regard to a social system that systematically privileges certain people at the expense of others, to
the desire of more powerful actors to neutralize
potential threats through the use of relatively benign political strategies. Whatever value might
have been in the minds of the regulators, however, Roberts very clearly believed that “racial balance” had nothing to do with power and domination, but was instead a question about the

169. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 731–
32 (2007). With regard to the benefits of diversity, see generally Christine Chambers Goodman, A Modest Proposal in Deference to Diversity, 23 NAT’L BLACK L.J. 1, 5 (2010); Gary
Orfield, Schools More Separate: Consequences of a Decade of Resegregation, (The Civil
Rights Project: Harvard Univ., 2001) https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED459217.pdf.

130

SMITH_MACROS.DOCM (DO NOT DELETE)

1]

4/10/2019 12:18 PM

Separating the Wheat from the Tares
allocation of seats based on ancestry and heredity. 170

Researchers have demonstrated that between 19962006, rates doubled of nearly all-minority schools (defined as
less than 5% of students as White), and that, on average, White
students attended schools in which 77% of the population was
White. 171 Furthermore, between 2005-2006, approximately
two-thirds of minority-majority schools were in areas with
“very high levels of segregation.” 172 Thus, minority students become “trap[ped] in an inescapable, generational cycle” of “racialized poverty,” which “decreases life opportunities . . . limits
educational attainment, constrains future earning potential, and
negatively impacts health and safety.” 173 In contrast, decades of
scholarship has established that “racially and economically integrated education can promote individual lifelong success, stabilize communities, and secure the economic viability of the nation.” 174
Despite these very real barriers for impoverished minority students, the Court concluded that “remedying past societal
discrimination does not justify race-conscious government action.” 175 In other words, the Court does not consider remedying
the effects of societal discrimination as its responsibility; and
yet the Court has not provided a viable avenue for state or federal legislatures to allow for programs to remedy the continued

170. Desautels-Stein, supra note 155, at 49.
171. See MARGUERITE L. SPENCER, ET AL, THE BENEFITS OF RACIAL AND ECONOMIC
INTEGRATION IN OUR EDUCATION SYSTEM: WHY THIS MATTERS FOR OUR DEMOCRACY,
4-5 (Kirwan Inst. for the Study of Race and Ethnicity: Ohio State Univ. 2009).
172. See id. at 4.
173. Id. at 1.
174. See id. at 4.
175. See e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701,
731 (2007).

131

SMITH_MACROS.DOCM (DO NOT DELETE)

BYU Education & Law Journal

4/10/2019 12:18 PM

[2019

social and economic issues caused by past legalized racism. 176
So, what can be done?
IV.WHAT AFFIRMATIVE ACTION RESEARCH TELLS US
Despite all of its flaws, Parents Involved does lay “promising legal groundwork for addressing racial isolation across and
within opportunity structures, including housing, public health,
economic development and transportation.” 177 Attempts by universities to implement affirmative action have produced the
most extensive research and analysis regarding the benefits of
diversity in education. Some of the primary educational benefits
of diversity include: “a positive impact on attitudes toward racial issues, . . .enhance[d] cognitive development, and . . . [an
increase in] overall satisfaction and involvement by students
with their educational institution.” 178 Furthermore, students
who engage in a more diverse educational environment experience “increased commitment to civic engagement, democratic
outcomes, community participation during and after college,”
and increases the likelihood of students “living in less segregated communities after college.” 179
Despite its demonstrated benefits, affirmative action has
been an increasingly controversial topic of discussion for the
last two decades since William Bowen and Derek Bok published their book The Shape of the River. 180 While affirmative
action has often been celebrated for its alleged benefit of increasing diversity in higher education institutions, in 2004 Pro176. See generally Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S.
701 (2007).
177. SPENCER, supra note 162, at 2.
178. Daryl G. Smith & Natalie B. Schonfeld, The Benefits of Diversity: What the Research Tells Us, 5 ABOUT CAMPUS, no. 5, 19 (2000).
179. Id. at 19-20.
180. Elizabeth Anderson, From Normative to Empirical Sociology in the Affirmative
Action Debate: Bowen and Bok’s “the Shape of the River,” 50 J. LEGAL EDUC. 284 (2000).
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fessor Richard Sander, a legal scholar and economist, published
an infamous criticism of affirmative action and the allegedly
negative effect of affirmative action on black law students. 181 In
fact, Sander asserted that he had conclusive evidence negative
impact on the numbers of qualified Black law students and
Black attorneys. 182 Sander’s statistical methodologies and subsequent conclusions, however, were later deemed to be flawed. 183
Part of this statistical analysis problem was exacerbated by his
paper being published in a law review, which is a publication
forum in which papers are edited by students instead of undergoing the same rigorous, peer-reviewed evaluation that academic journals undergo in other fields. Despite the many flaws
of Sander’s work, his paper has forced the academic community
to take a hard look at the use of affirmative action policies,
which has led to important information about the continued
value of these policies in the process of universities attracting
diverse student bodies. 184
It is important to note that while affirmative action can
help promote diversity, “[i]f all we do over the [next] twentyfive years is affirmative action, then we will still need affirmative action.” 185 In other words, the current state of affirmative
action policies will never be sufficient to achieve a fully equal
United States, due to its limited focus on education and employment. However, in spite of such weaknesses, affirmative action policies appear to be one of the only legal options left in

181. See Michele Landis Dauber, The Big Muddy, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1899, 1903 (2005);
See Ian Ayres & Richard Brooks, Does Affirmative Action Reduce the Number of Black Lawyers?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1807, 1809 (2005).
182. See Dauber, supra note 181; See Ayres & Brooks, supra note 181.
183. See Dauber, supra note 181; See Ayres & Brooks, supra note 181.
184. See Ayres & Brooks, supra note 181; David L. Chambers et. al., The Real Impact of
Eliminating Affirmative Action in American Law Schools: An Empirical Critique of Richard
Sander’s Study, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1855, 1857 (2005).
185. Kevin R. Johnson, The Last Twenty Five Years of Affirmative Action?, 21 CONST.
COMMENT. 171, 188, n.82 (2004) (quoting Nat Hentoff, Sandra Day O’Connor’s Elitist Decision, VILLAGE VOICE (July 29, 2003), at 30 (quoting Lisa Naverette)).
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this era of neoliberal strict scrutiny of race-based remedial programs, thus suggesting the need to improve our current affirmative action policies.
Improving affirmative action will require new perspectives about the purpose of remedial programs (created to increase the academic success of racial minorities) and about new
approaches to diversity. “At a bare minimum, the crisis in the
public schools must be addressed before true integration of colleges and universities is a possibility.” 186 This “crisis” in public
schools seems especially concerning regarding the correlation
between socioeconomic status and race. 187
One compelling approach to improving affirmative action policies to promote diversity is that of Christine Goodman’s “True Diversity Experience” based on: Access, Environment, and Self-Interest. 188 Goodman defines these three
elements as follows:
[S]chools at each level will provide greater
Access,
and
more
consistently
attract diverse students and students who appreciate and value diversity. Participating schools will
also
learn
how
to
retain
more of
their diverse students, as they create and foster an
Environment
conducive
to
maintaining diversity. The participating schools will be
motivated to succeed in this experiment through
their own Self-Interest, which will include
providing access and opportunities for un-

186. Id. at 188.
187. MARGUERITE L. SPENCER, ET AL, THE BENEFITS OF RACIAL AND ECONOMIC
INTEGRATION IN OUR EDUCATION SYSTEM: WHY THIS MATTERS FOR OUR DEMOCRACY,
6-9 (Kirwan Inst. for the Study of Race and Ethnicity: Ohio State Univ. 2009).
188. Christine Chambers Goodman, A Modest Proposal in Deference to Diversity, 23
NAT’L BLACK L.J. 1, 69 (2010).
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derrepresented
groups,
cultivating
a diverse learning environment, and increasing
their
attractiveness
to
the
kinds
of diverse students that they want to enroll. 189

This push for a more holistic approach to diversity is
supported by other research regarding the need for “true” integration, as one researcher found that “simple desegregation efforts often fail” and instead result in “assimilation, segregation
within schools, ability grouping and tracking.” 190 Instead, comprehensive racial and socioeconomic approaches to integration
and diversity will give American “students the knowledge and
skills necessary to become full members of our democratic society, and to strengthen and legitimize our democracy.” 191 Ultimately, a move toward diversity is a move toward a more democratic society.
V. CONCLUSION: THE WAY FORWARD
Like a sliver embedded deep in a person’s skin with layers of skin having grown over the top, race has been embedded
in American Jurisprudence since the Dred Scott decision. Although it may be tempting to try to simply pluck out race (the
sliver) from the law (the skin), this is impossible to do at this
point in our history, as layers of law have grown around the
foreign object of race (e.g. the Supreme Court’s Parents Involved decision). And just as an embedded sliver causes a lingering pain in the flesh, the ongoing spectre of race (with all
the attendant individual and collective pain it has caused) must
prompt the Court to continue to consciously consider race in

189. Id.
190. SPENCER, supra note 187, at 2.
191. Id. at 3.
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its decisions if educational institutions are to fix the damage
caused by the past two and a half centuries of legalized racism
in the U.S. I believe much of this damage can be remedied by
focusing efforts on racial and socioeconomic “true” integration
efforts, through the use of the “True Diversity Experience”
proposed by Christine Goodwin. 192
It appears that the current state of American law is like
that of the biblical parable of the wheat and the tares. 193 The
work of our collective “enemy” of the highest ideals of American democracy—the effect of past bigoted jurisprudence—has
sown the “tares” of racism in the laws of the United States. 194
Those Supreme Court justices who supported Chief Justice
Roberts’ opinion in Parents Involved appear to be making the
argument of the servants in the parable: “The servants said unto him, Wilt thou then that we go and gather [the tares] up?” 195
Chief Justice Roberts’ decision reflects a narrow reading of past
precedent that prematurely “roots up” both the “tares” (the use
of race in the law) as well as the “wheat” (the goal of raceneutral school policies). While it is noble for the Court to seek
to end of the use of race in education at all, that is separation
must come at a time when there is no longer a need for racebased remedial measures under the law—when the proverbial
“harvest” comes and the “tares” of race-based policies can be
properly separated from the “wheat” of race-neutral school policies, due to greater equality in public education. 196

192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

Goodman, supra note 188, at 69.
Matthew 13:24-30 (King James).

Id.
Matthew 13:28 (King James).
See generally Erwin Chemerinsky, The Segregation and Resegregation of American
Public Education: The Courts’ Role, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1597 (2003); Gary Orfield, Schools More
Separate: Consequences of a Decade of Resegregation, (The Civil Rights Project: Harvard
Univ., 2001) https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED459217.pdf. See Justin Desautels-Stein, Race
as a Legal Concept, 2 COLUM. J. RACE & L., 42–50 (2012); MARGUERITE L. SPENCER, ET AL,
THE BENEFITS OF RACIAL AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN OUR EDUCATION SYSTEM:
WHY THIS MATTERS FOR OUR DEMOCRACY, 6-9 (Kirwan Inst. for the Study of Race and
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Bigotry is an enemy to American democracy, for it
blinds the minds of those who have a duty to protect our nation’s most cherished ideals: “Life, Liberty and the pursuit of
Happiness.” 197 While we as a nation are not accountable for the
sins of our ancestors, we are responsible to correct the legacy
those sins have left us – a legacy that is still alive and well in the
form of past de jure segregation, and continued de jure segregation in the present. As American law is iterative, and is therefore built on layers of precedent, the jurists of today have a duty
to promote our democracy by, first, healing the damage done
by past jurists’ abuse of the law; and, second, restoring the integrity of American law as the backbone of American democracy.
As I have demonstrated in this article, race and the law
have grown together in a complex knot throughout the history
of the United States. This knot will only be disentangled when
jurists admit that the damage caused by past centuries of racist
laws continues to exist, and when so-called “colorblind” neoliberal jurisprudence no longer ties the hands of any legislative
and local political leaders from instituting policies which effectively remedy past discrimination. 198 The Supreme Court
should not now wash its hands of legal precedent by claiming
that race must be ignored in developing solutions to this problem, as significant legal damage was caused by judges functioning in legally racist paradigms for centuries. 199 As one scholar
put it, it is “unconscionable to imagine our equal protection
doctrine as ultimately having no power to cure the lingering effects of this nation’s horribly racist past.” 200
Ethnicity: Ohio State Univ. 2009).
197. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
198. See generally Mario L. Barnes, et. al., A Post-Race Equal Protection?, 98 GEO. L.J.
967, 980-91 (2010).
199. Justin Desautels-Stein, Race as a Legal Concept, 2 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 1, 4
(2012).
200. Barnes, supra note 198, at 1004 (citation omitted).
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To effectively address the damage done to the law and
by the law—especially in America’s education system—jurists
and lawmakers must recognize race, not as a biological fact, but
as a social and legal construct that continues to negatively impact racial and ethnic minorities in the United States. By utilizing this interpretive frame, the Court can assist national and local leaders to remedy the effects of race-based discrimination.
Improvement might include benchmarks set by non-partisan
organizations that rely one reliable statistical data, to determine
which measurements are vital in determining whether “improving life circumstances–matches our aspirations” in rectifying
the disparate impact of race-based policies. 201
Until the time that we as a society achieve “true” diversity and integration, 202 our leaders, as well as the American electorate, should talk of racial progress as an aspiration, and not as
a past goal that we long ago achieved. In the words of Justice
Blackmun: “In order to get beyond racism, we must first take
account of race. There is no other way. And in order to treat
some persons equally, we must treat them differently. We cannot—we dare not—let the Equal Protection Clause perpetuate
racial supremacy.” 203

Hayden Smith ∗

201. Id.
202. See Christine Chambers Goodman, A Modest Proposal in Deference to Diversity,
23 NAT’L BLACK L.J. 1, 69 (2010); MARGUERITE L. SPENCER, ET AL, THE BENEFITS OF
RACIAL AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN OUR EDUCATION SYSTEM: WHY THIS MATTERS
FOR OUR DEMOCRACY 3 (Kirwan Inst. for the Study of Race and Ethnicity: Ohio State Univ.
2009).
203. Regents of Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 407 (1978).
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